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The objective of this work was to determine if there is a relationship between profitability and the participation of women in
the Council of Administration (CA) in companies listed on the
Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV). We worked with a sample of
37 companies with the participation of women in the CA and
with 32 companies where there is no participation of women in
the CA; indicators were calculated for profitability and financial
leverage. The findings show that the performance of the companies with the participation of women in the CA is more often
measured with the Return on Invested Capital, and that they have
less financial leverage at these companies, thus proving women’s
aversion to taking risks, a variable that is linked to profitability
and which would also explain the lower yield shown by the other
three indicators of profitability.
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Resumen

Palabras clave
Género, consejo
de administración,
rentabilidad,
apalancamiento

El objetivo de este trabajo fue determinar si existe una relación
entre rentabilidad y la participación de mujeres en el Consejo
de Administración (CA) de las empresas listadas en la Bolsa
Mexicana de Valores (BMV). Trabajamos con una muestra de
37 empresas con la participación de mujeres en el CA y con 32
empresas donde no hay participación de mujeres en el CA; se
calcularon indicadores de rentabilidad y apalancamiento financiero. Los resultados muestran que el desempeño de las empresas
con participación de mujeres en el CA con mayor frecuencia se
mide con el Retorno sobre el capital invertido y que tienen menos
apalancamiento financiero en estas empresas, lo que demuestra
la aversión de las mujeres a tomar riesgos, una variable que está
vinculado a rentabilidad, y que también explicaría el menor rendimiento mostrado por los otros tres indicadores de rentabilidad.

A relação entre a rentabilidade e a participação
das mulheres no conselho de administração
das empresas que cotam na bolsa
Resumo

Palavras chave
Gênero, conselho
de administração,
rentabilidade,
alavancagem

O objetivo deste trabalho consistiu em determinar se existe uma
relação entre a rentabilidade e a participação da mulher no conselho de administração (CA) nas empresas que cotam na Bolsa
Mexicana de Valores. Se trabalhou com base em uma mostra de
37 empresas que contam com a participação de mulheres no CA
e com 32 empresas que não contam com a participação de mulheres no CA, se calcularam indicadores financeiros de rentabilidade
e de alavancagem. Os resultados mostram que o rendimento das
empresas que contam com a participação de mulheres no CA
é maior medido com o retorno sobre o capital invertido, a alavancagem financeira nestas empresas é menor, provando assim
a aversão das mulheres a assumir riscos, variável que se encontra
ligada à rentabilidade e que explicaria também o menor rendimento, mostrado pelos outros três indicadores de rentabilidade.
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Introduction
The mission of a board of directors (BofD) is to ratify and check the important
decisions of the company, as well as the mechanisms that enable the effective separation of the management and control of decisions (Simon & Wong, 2001). The
BofD comes as a solution to the problem of agency created by the separation of
ownership and control as a mechanism of governance and control for the proper
functioning of organizations (Simon & Wong, 2001).
Gender diversity in economic power and, in particular, on the BofD of listed
companies, is reduced at a global level. However, there is a debate about whether
the participation of women in these boards could have an impact on the company’s
performance (Gómez & Sánchez, 2009). In Mexico, the Code of Best Corporate
Practices notes that a diverse composition in the BofD is desirable to achieve
its functions and that it is important to consider the inclusion of independent
directors (Deloitte, 2014a). Esteban (2007) has pointed out that gender diversity
BofD is justified for different reasons, including: Gender diversity is an indicator
of corporate social responsibility; it generates greater creativity in decision-making
and represents reality better; and it increases the responsibility of the company,
among others.
However, Mexico is the country with the lowest representation of women in
top management positions in Latin America, and current studies show that having
at least three women on the BofD of a company means better economic performance and a greater margin of profits, as well as an increase in sales and return
on investment (Deloitte, 2014a).
The existence of a diverse BofD is valued positively by the interest groups
—including customers, shareholders, employees, and suppliers, who believe it
will somehow contribute to the commercial success of companies to incorporate
different perspectives and opinions (Acero & Alcalde, 2010). Therefore, it is time
for the companies to value the involvement of various types of directors and the
incorporation of women in the government bodies and in decision making, in order
to provide a counterweight to gender and diversity of points of view (Deloitte,
2014b). However, women who break the “glass ceiling” in organizations are those
who become part of the board (Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgagne, 2007).
The research question to be answered is: Does the participation of women in
the BofD of the companies listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV, for its
initials in Spanish) have an impact on the profitability? As such, the objective of
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this work is to determine if the participation of women in the BofD of the companies listed on the BMV has an impact on profitability.
This work is divided into three parts: (1) the theoretical framework, where the
topics of gender diversity, participation of women in the board, and its relationship
with corporate profitability are developed; (2) the methodology, which presents the
conceptualization of variables, the determination of the sample, and the formulation of hypotheses; and (3) the results, which present the analysis and interpretation
of data, as well as the conclusions.

Theoretical Framework
Gender diversity in organizations
Gender diversity in the workforce, the heterogeneity of the equipment managers
and diversity in the leadership styles bring new values and have benefits for people
and for social progress, in addition to being able to be evaluated for their economic profitability (Gómez & Sánchez, 2009).
However, the access of women to the boards of family businesses is often associated with kinship; in this regard, Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, and Escot (2010) found
that the probability of a director being a woman goes from 4.58% to 14.02% if the
company is a family business. The opposite happens with non-family businesses,
where the election of the members of the board is more objective and is based to
a greater extent on the qualifications of the nominees. Therefore, it is considered
that it is important to include women in the board, but that this inclusion should
be based on economic and non-affective reasons, because it is necessary to select
qualified women to provide their views for better decision-making (Martín & Minguez, 2014).
It is worth mentioning that there are several theories on the role of women in
managerial positions. In this regard, Mateos de Cabo, Iturrioz, and Gimeno (2008)
describe the following:
1. The human capital theory establishes that there is less investment in human
capital (education and training) by women, because they give priority to the
family.
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2. The theories of labor market segmentation provide that employers, trade
unions and mobility cause several sectors to have different wage conditions
and different possibilities of promotion and stability to be distinguished. In
this case, the family situation is what makes women tend to interrupt their
work and focus on not demanding sectors in terms of financial, human capital, and technology.
3. The Marxist theory explains the differences in the role of women in the capitalist system as a key element in the socialization of minorities and in the
reproduction of the labor force; it also claims that they act as a potential reserve in the labor market that puts pressure on workers to accept worse wages
and conditions.
4. Gender theories focus on the role of women in the values of society (stereotypes) that differentiate traditionally male and female jobs. This explains the
greater presence of women in part-time jobs or in certain occupations, such as
domestic service or health and social services.
5. Institutionalism theories are based on the interest of certain groups to institutionalize inequalities through the legal norms reflected in aspects such as
contracts of employment or marriage. The stakeholders range from businessmen to political parties, although women influence their own discrimination
by accepting the conditions imposed on them.
It is important to note that discrimination occurs both in the difficulties to
access high-level posts and Management Board membership and in the remuneration that women receive for their work. Table 1 shows that, in most of the
occupational groups, women are paid less per hour worked than men; thus, it is
noted that, in high-level posts (officials and executives), the difference is of 22
pesos less for women, which is much greater than that of other groups of people,
thus showing that, the higher the position, the higher the salary discrimination.
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Table 1. Average income per hour worked
Occupational groups

38

Men

Women

Professionals, technicians and art workers

67.09

60.70

Education workers

76.47

70.96

Staff and managers in the public, private and social sectors

99.76

77.55

Workers in agricultural activities, livestock, forestry, hunting and fishing

19.03

20.92

Industrial workers, craftsmen and assistants

30.72

24.13

Drivers and driver assistants of mobile machinery and means of transportation

29.86

28.66

Office workers and clerks

40.74

39.65

Merchants

29.79

27.04

Workers in personal services

25.66

26.8

Workers in protection and surveillance services and armed forces

32.26

35.56

Source: INEGI (2016).

The participation of women in the board of directors
In most member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), efforts to expand opportunities for women in the labor
market and to establish gender equality in the workplace have been part of the
policy objectives in recent decades (Casey, Skibnes, & Pringle, 2011). For example,
female representation in the boards of directors in Spain has increased in recent
years, one of the main reasons being the Gender Equality Act, which provides
that corporations with more than 250 workers must develop a plan of equality (Informa D&B, 2010) to balance the participation of men and women in the board
by establishing, among other strategies, a gender quota. However, the adoption of
gender quotas is effective for gender equality only when used in combination with
other measures, including the access to managerial positions and to the boards of
directors of the companies (Adriaanse & Schofiel, 2014).
One of the variables that have been linked to the presence of women in the
BofD is the level of disclosure of information (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011). In this
regard, gender diversity in the BofD could improve the quality of the discussions
in the board and increase its capacity to supervise the process of disclosure of

Equidad Desarro. N.º 32 • julio-diciembre de 2018

The Relationship between Profitability and the Participation of Women in the Board of Directors

corporate information. This is something that McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria,
and Salipante (2008) coincide in, suggesting that gender diversity in the BofD is
associated with a higher quality of deliberations of the board and a more effective
communication, which contributes to a better quality of information to shareholders. On the other hand, female participation in the BofD generates a greater
control over management actions and corporate transparency through a greater
presence in the meetings of the board and audit committees and the increase of
good governance practices adopted (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007).
About the participation of women in the BofD of the companies, Hernández,
Camarena, and Castanedo (2009) found that, in a sample of 50 companies listed
on the Mexican Stock Exchange, only 7% of the members are women. This percentage increases to 12% when the members are alternates. Moreover, Camarena
and Saavedra (2018) found that, in a sample of 107 companies listed on the BMV,
only 4.56% of the members of the council on average are women, and that, analyzing the reports of the companies, the majority of women who participate in these
councils were found to be related to the main shareholder of the company—that
is, that they are their wives, daughters, or sisters.
Helke and Kirch (2015) analyzed the composition of the BofD of the 100 largest
European banks and the 60 largest insurance companies in Europe, where more
than half of the employees are women, and found that only 8.5% of the members
of the BofD in insurance companies are women, while in banks this percentage
is higher, at 18%. Although these percentages are low, four of the banks analyzed
and five insurance companies showed a significant increase in the ratio of female
members of the BofD.
Deloitte (2013), for its part, conducted a study with a sample of 299 companies
in Mexico and found that slightly more than half of the BofD (51%) have female
members, which is lower than the percentage obtained in previous assessments.
There is also a decrease in the proportion of women who make up the board: in
2011, some progress was made in this regard, with almost 25% female members;
however, in 2012, 85% of the board members of Mexican companies were men
and only 15 were women. As for those boards of directors that do have female
members, the average number of women was 1.68, when it used to be 1.8 in 2011.
On the other hand, only 11% of the members of the BofD of public enterprises
were women, while in family enterprises the proportion reaches 19% and in private
companies 18%. However, this contrasts with the findings of Dalton and Dalton
(2010), who found that 57.3% of the companies in the Fortune 500 list had two
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women in the BofD, while 19.5% had three or more, showing the great progress in
the participation of women in large companies at the international level.
In a study conducted in Spain, Mateos de Cabo, Iturrioz, and Gimeno (2008)
found that favorable and close environments between workers and managers—such
as those found in small companies or family businesses—that apply and promote
measures of conciliation facilitate the presence of women in their BofD. These
findings are consistent with those of Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, and Escot (2010)
about the probability of a board member being a woman increasing from 4.58% to
12.58% if the company were a cooperative.
Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, and Escot (2010) found that the proportion of women
on the BofD of Spanish companies is low due to some evidence of discrimination:
the proportion of women is greater when there are more asientos dominicales available1; in fact, there are exclusionary companies in which homogeneity prevails
within the board and some companies are systematically underestimating the capacities of women, but this situation is likely to disappear if companies already
have female board members.
Nelson and Levesque (2007), for their part, found that, in large corporations
in the United States, women don’t have a role in either senior management or the
BofD; there are also no women in this position in companies funded by venture
capital and high-tech companies. However, these corporations should consider
what Martín and Minguez (2014) found in a sample of non-financial companies in
Spain between 2003 and 2008, which is that the presence of women in the BofD
has a positive effect.

Corporate profitability and its relationship with the
participation of women in the board of directors
Several studies have analyzed the relationship between women’s participation in
the BofD and the measurement of financial performance, such as the performance and value of the company, as seen in Table 2 below.

Proprietary membership, whereby the director is a member of the B or D, on account of being
a shareholder of the company.

1
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Table 2. Relationship between the participation of women in the board
of directors and financial performance
Variable

Relationship

Author

Gender

Percentage of women
participating in the board with
respect to the total number of
directors.

Performance

Percentage of women
participating in the board
and its relationship with the
performance of the company

+

Martin and Minguez (2014),
Francoeur, Labelle, and SinclairDesgagne (2008).

Value of the
company

Percentage of women
participating in the board and
its relation to the value of the
company in the primary sector.

-

Martín and Minguez (2014).

Value of the
company

Percentage of women
participating in the board and its
relationship with the value of the
company in the secondary and
tertiary sectors.

+

Martín and Minguez (2014).

Value of the
company

Percentage of women
participating in the board and its
relationship with the value of the
company.

+

Adler (2001), Carter et al. (2003),
the Catalyst (2004).

Company
listed on
the stock
exchange

Percentage of women
participating in the board in
companies listed on the stock
exchange.

-

Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, and
Escot (2010).

N/A

Hillman, Shropshire and
Cannella (2007); Adams and
Ferreira (2007); Gul, Srinidhi,
and Ng (2011).

Source: Own elaboration based on the cited authors.

As you can see in Table 2 above, the majority of research shows a positive relationship between the participation of women in the B or D and the company’s
performance or value, but not so much when it comes to companies in the primary
sector, or when the relationship is established by the fact that the company is listed
on the stock exchange, because women are generally present in small businesses
that do not have the possibility of listing.
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Methodology
42

A quantitative research with transversal design was conducted using data from two
groups of companies—those with female participation in the BofD and those without, and a t-test was used to calculate the mean difference between the two groups.
Furthermore, a number of financial variables were calculated for each company, namely the net profit margin, return on assets, return on assets, return on
investment, and leverage.

Conceptualization of variables
The following section includes the definitions of the variables that will be used to
measure financial performance.
Net margin. It is the remnant that a company has after deducting the operating
and financial expenses. It is expressed as a percentage.
Return on equity. It is the company’s performance with regard to equity, and
it is obtained by dividing the net profit by shareholders’ equity. It is expressed as a
percentage.
Return on assets. It is the performance of the company with respect to investment in assets, and it is obtained by dividing the net income by the net assets. It is
expressed as a percentage.
Return on investment. It is the return on investment of the capital (ROIC) of
the company, and it is calculated with the following formula:

ROIC =

(1 –

a
100

(*

b
100
c *

Where:
a: Income tax
b: Operating result (EBIT, or earnings before interest and taxes)
c: Capital investment
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Capital investment. Total assets (cash and cash equivalents), current liabilities,
financial liabilities, and other credits without cost in the short term.
Financial leverage. It is a measure of the financial risk, and it is directly related
to the long-term debt of the company and its effect on profits. The higher this
indicator is, the higher the financial risk. It is expressed in times.
Total leverage. It is a measure of the total risk, and it is obtained by dividing the
total liabilities by the total assets. The higher this indicator is, the higher the risk
of the company. It is expressed as a percentage.
Number of employees. The number of active employees at the end of 2015.
Value of assets. The value of total assets at the end of the year 2015, expressed
in thousands of pesos.
Capital value. The value of the company’s equity at the end of the year 2015,
expressed in thousands of pesos.

Hypothesis
The hypotheses to be proved in this research are:
Ho1: The net margin of companies with women on the BofD is equal to that
of companies with no women on the BofD.
Ho2: The return of active companies with women on the BofD is equal to that
of companies with no women on the BofD.
Ho3: The return on equity of companies with women on the BofD is equal to
that of companies with no women on the BofD.
Ho4: The return on investment of companies with women on the BofD is
equal to that of companies with no women on the BofD.
Ho5: The financial leverage of companies with women on the BofD is equal
to that of companies with no women on the BofD.
Ho6: The total leverage of companies with women on the BofD is equal to
that of companies with no women on the BofD.
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Ho7: The number of employees in companies with women on the BofD is
equal to that of companies with no women on the BofD.
44

Ho8: The value of the assets of companies with women on the BofD is equal
to that of companies with no women on the BofD.
Ho9: The equity value of companies with women on the BofD is equal to that
of companies with no women on the BofD.

Sampling
The sample is made up of all companies listed on the BMV as of the year 2015—
that is, an analysis was carried out using 100% of the companies listed in that year,
only removing companies from the financial sector and companies with incomplete information, for a total of 69 companies, 37 of which have women in the B
or D and 32 of which do not.

Results
The first step in the analysis of the data was to determine the financial indicators
of both groups of companies, the results of which are presented in the following
tables. Table 3 shows the financial indicators of companies with participation of
women in the CA.

Equidad Desarro. N.º 32 • julio-diciembre de 2018

-4.9

0.4
7.5

Industrias Peñoles, SAB de CC (PE&BACE)

Grupo Bimbo, SAB de CV (BIMBO)

L’Organización cultiba, SAB de CV (CULTIBA)

Fomento Económico Mexicano, SAB de CV

Grupo Gigante, SAB de CV (GIGANTE)

17

18

19

20

5.9

2.7

-0.8

2.3

6.6

6.4

1.2

16

-10.4

Mexichem, SAB de CV (MEXCHEM)

Corporación Inmobiliaria Vesta, SAB de CV

10

-32.6

Grupo Lamosa, SAB de CV (LAMOSA)

Grupo TMM, S.A. (TMM)

9

7.8
4.3

15

Promotora Ambiental, SAB de CV (PASA)

8

14

Grupo Sanborns, SAB de CV (GSANBOR)

7

5.7

34.2

Cydsa, SAB de CV (CYDSASA)

Grupo Industrial Saltillo, SAB de CV (GISSA)

6

Compañia Minera Autlan, SAB De CV

Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico, SAB de CV (GAP)

5

4.7

8.8

13

Internacional de Cerámica, SAB de CV

4

12

Consorcio ARA, SAB de CV (ARA)

3

4.3
2.5

Altos Hornos de México, S.A. de CV (AHMSA)

Grupo Aeroméxico, SAB de CV (AEROMEX)

2

Net
margin

11

ACCEL, SAB de CV (ACCELSA)

1

Company

3.9

5.7

0.5

3

-0.4

1.5

4.4

2.1

0.6

-6.9

-0.3

-8.2

3.4

8.4

3.9

8.8

6.2

3.5

2.3

6

8.9

9.6

0.9

9.6

-0.8

3.6

10.8

3.8

1.2

-24.3

-0.4

-236

6.7

11.8

6.5

12.5

12.5

5.3

10.8

9.6

Return
Return
on assets on equity

7.1

6.7

3.7

5.9

2.8

5.5

10.1

3.9

1.8

-5.2

3

3.2

4.8

12.3

5.8

10

12.9

3.7

7.1

6.5

ROIC

Table 3. Companies with the participation of women in the board of directors

-3.5

3.1

-0.7

20.8

0.2

-1.9

45.5

21.2

-0.4

2.5

0.1

16.2

25.5

1.6

29.6

2.3

-90.7

1.7

-3.5

1.6

Financial
leverage

56.2

40.9

41.6

69.0

42.3

57.6

59.0

49.9

52.5

71.7

34.0

96.5

49.3

28.9

39.1

29.6

50.2

33.5

78.4

37.3

Total
leverage of
l’ENTO

25,000

187,642

37,767

127,152

11,555

18,803

4663

1416

2017

20,435

61

1779

5338

48,125

6851

885

4087

872

13,392

3823

Number of
employees

40,335,869

492,850,032

31,129,110

237,468,546

133,522,439

176,264,441

23,075,004

18,904,410

9,881,617

64,358,240

31,012,428

11,901,444

4,650,422

42,144,595

17,557,477

35,122,665

7,867,167

18,085,673

60,477,003

4,689,608

Assets
(thousands
of pesos)

Continues

18,653,638

200,213,978

9,308,037

70,850,558

61,054,852

60,609,972

7,086,322

9,343,011

4,574,704

23,228,591

19,824,732

-224,184

2,180,682

28,301,021

10,979,864

20,151,264

2,710,903

11,712,368

12,980,661

2,319,046

Equity
(thousands
of pesos)
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Grupo Posadas, SAB de CV (Buenos Aires)

37

14

6.8

10.1

4.9

-3.4

8

4.4

-0.9

0.2

-12.4

-7.6

2.9

-5.7

6

10.4

3.7

11.5

Source: Own elaboration, based on data from the Mexican Stock Exchange.

Grupo Televisa, SAB (TLEVISA)

El Puerto de Liverpool, SAB de CV (LIVEPOL)

35

Grupo Radio Centro, SAB de CV (RCENTRO)

36

0.5

Grupo QUMMA, S. A. de CV (QUMMA)

33

34

-4.1

Telecomunicaciones Maxcom, SAB de CV

-16.9
-29.3

Axtel, SAB de CV (Artsonic)

4.1

31

América Móvil, SAB de CV (AMX)

30

-9.2

2.7

5.4

3.4

32

Corporativo Fragua, SAB de CV (FRAGUA)

Genomma Lab. Internacional, SAB de CV (Travaux
pratiques)

28

29

Organizacion Soriana, SAB de CV (SORIANA)

Wal-Mart de México, SAB de CV (WALMEX)

27

8.2

12.7

5.3

2.4

-13

13

12.4

-1.9

0.3

-24.8

-41.7

23

-10.9

10.9

17.4

7.4

15.4

9.5

64.3

9.3

5.8

Return
Return
on assets on equity

5.3

10.1

6.7

7.6

0.4

-2.9

2.8

10

-4.4

13

15.4

6.2

19.1

8.6

25.7

6.5

15.2

ROIC

4.4

1.9

-7.1

0.1

-0.2

1.1

1.9

-3

1.2

2.4

1.8

2.6

1.5

10.3

7.2

-1.2

-115.4

Financial
leverage

73.7

38.4

64.6

50.7

42.6

49.9

81.7

87.6

47.5

45.1

40.1

47.3

25.6

48.3

80.2

43.0

58.1

Total
leverage of
l’ENTO

14,461

55,000

43,964

434

4900

1133

7000

195,475

894

29,540

121,000

81,800

29,770

83,712

8039

8304

19,117

Number of
employees

15,720,722

134,911,371

293,270,028

5,376,400

1,206,122

3,892,804

32,167,317

1,515,897,614

18,203,079

16,292,569

287,930,302

123,996,343

39,772,818

240,162,099

39,919,541

25,983,686

52,771,756

Assets
(thousands
of pesos)

3,266,223

74,936,739

85,125,941

2,830,035

643,742

800,552

2,646,629

208,915,243

9,487,701

9,513,549

167,026,016

52,801,573

27,206,734

113,941,865

5,735,251

7,082,462

21,790,534

Equity
(thousands
of pesos)

•

26

Le Coca-Cola Femsa, SAB de CV (KOF)

Grupo Lala, SAB de CV (LALA)

24

25

23

7.9
13.5

Grupo Herdez, SAB de CV (Entreprise)

Kimberly Clark de México SAB de CV

22

1.9

Gruma, SAB de CV (GRUMA)

21

Net
margin
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Minera Frisco, SAB de CV (MFRISCO)

Grupo Pochteca, SAB de CV (POCHTEC)

Proteak Uno, SAB de CV (Teck)

18

Grupo México, SAB de CV (GMEXICO)

15

16

Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, SAB de CV

14

17

0.4

13.1

0.6

-27.7

15.8

7.6

25.9

La Corporación Moctezuma, SAB de CV

Industrielle Convertidora, SAB de CV (Conversion)

13

0.9

4.4

49.7

4.9

8.5

22.7

12.2

12

Cemex, SAB de CV (CEMEX)

Sare Holding, SAB de CV (SARE)

8

11

12.6

Le Mexique, l’OHL SAB de CV (OHLMEX)

7

Vinte Viviendas Integrales, SAB de CV (VINTE)

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SAB (GMD)

6

Alpek, SAB de CV (ALPEK)

Grupo Carso, SAB de CV (GCARSO)

5

9

Dîner, SAB de CV (Dîner)

4

10

-20.8

Corpovael SAB de CV (CADU)

3

2.3

Alfa, SAB de CV (ALFA)

2

20.9

Infraestructura Energética Nova, SAB de CV
(IENOVA)

Net
margin

1

Company

1.1

0.9

-7.9

5.8

3.4

0.2

23.8

0.4

4.9

9.6

-1.7

6.2

1.8

8

2.3

7.8

2.2

4

1.8

2.8

-22.7

10.9

6.2

0.6

29.9

1.3

10.6

21.8

-4.2

11.1

4.3

11.8

3.6

13.3

7.3

6.4

Return
Return
on assets on equity

1.5

7.2

-0.3

9.3

5

4

34.6

3.4

9.4

12.9

-0.4

7.6

5.4

10.4

-2.1

10.3

8.7

4.1

ROIC

Table 4. Companies with no participation of women in the board of directors

-0.3

-0.6

1.2

2.8

5.9

0

1.3

-0.3

8.4

2.7

1.1

3.9

-1.8

2

-2.1

1.9

-2

1.8

Financial
leverage

40.1

68.6

65.1

46.8

45.4

59

20.3

69.8

53.9

55.8

60.1

43.8

58.2

32.3

37.6

41.5

70.1

37.8

Total
leverage of
l’ENTO

113

1464

6136

30,271

2694

1102

1121

11,064

5096

2018

46

1506

1735

73,000

43

2802

40,000

639

Number of
employees

Table 4 shows the indicators of companies with no participation of women in the board.

5,712,997

3,710,060

51,010,439

471,633,338

30,567,490

1,686,218

13,616,888

599,728,320

91,500,444

3,957,481

2,586,129

127,085,143

8,560,351

102,967,183

6,540,905

6,076,608

348,938,705

118,766,561

Assets
(thousands of
pesos)

Continues

3,153,611

1,245,677

15,718,285

217,826,911

16,997,155

631,027

11,250,340

167,774,547

37,072,528

1,581,257

987,125

65,489,827

2,921,469

59,375,987

3,579,935

3,357,904

76,151,209

52,908,659

Equity
(thousands of
pesos)
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CMR, SAB de CV (CMR)

Hoteles City Express, SAB de CV (HCITY)

Hilasal Mexicana SAB de CV (HILASAL)

Rassini, SAB de CV (RASSINI)

Grupo Vasconia SAB (VASCONI)

28

29

30

31

32

8.6

3.3

6.4

-12.5

12.1

1.5

3.2

-10.1

22.6

9.4

2.7

6.9

-6.5

2

1.8

3.1

-1.1

11.3

4.7

0.1

4.7

3.6

4.3

Source: own elaboration, with data from the Mexican Stock Exchange.

Telesites, SAB de CV (SITES)

Alsea, SAB de CV (ALSEA)

Megacable Holdings, SAB de CV (MEGA)

25

26

Empresas Cablevision, S.A. de CV (Câble)

24

0

3.4

2.3

3.8

8.3

5.3

20.8

-15.1

2.7

3.5

10.5

-5.5

16.2

7.4

0.3

6.3

7.1

8.2

13.7

Return
Return
on assets on equity

3.5

13.2

-3.7

2.7

3.1

6

0

11.8

8.6

2.9

5.5

7.9

6.6

16.8

ROIC

4

4.9

1.4

419.6

6.8

19.8

1.9

1.5

-2.6

-0.5

2.3

5.1

-2.7

1.8

Financial
leverage

49.9

66.6

56.7

24.6

48.5

70.0

80.5

30.0

36.1

71.4

26.3

49

47.6

31.3

Total
leverage of
l’ENTO

1629

5797

589

2516

5843

61,822

171

16,010

3240

8706

1668

42,096

9771

21,964

Number of
employees

3,385,922

13,833,940

652,122

11,274,431

2,045,350

37,995,141

43,624,645

31,390,771

21,389,127

5,415,864

4,363,843

50,741,186

9,493,085

45,101,509

Assets
(thousands of
pesos)

1,772,167

5,045,930

253,869

7,267,853

932,582

8,910,623

9,836,082

20,820,211

12,249,649

1,532,752

3,010,444

26,033,202

4,461,021

31,662,142

Equity
(thousands of
pesos)

•

27

Grupo Minsa, SAB de CV (MINSA)

Farmacias Benavides, SAB de CV (BEVIDES)

Grupo Comercial Chedraui, SAB de CV

21

22

Grupo Bafar, SAB de CV (BAFAR)

20

23

Industrias Bachoco, SAB de CV (BACHOCO)

19

Net
margin
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To test the first hypothesis raised, we calculated the average and standard deviation of each indicator from the two groups of companies under study (Table 5).
49

Table 5. Average and standard deviation of financial indicators
Indicators
Net margin
Return on assets
Return on equity
ROIC
Financial leverage
Total leverage
Number of employees
Value of assets (thousands of pesos)
Value of equity (billions pesos)

Women in the
(BofD)

N

Media

Standard
deviation

With directors

37

2.2270

11.3355

Without directors

32

6.46.56

13.9329

With directors

37

2.4541

5.2719

Without directors

32

3.7438

5.5225

With directors

37

-1.1081

42.8119

Without directors

32

6.1938

9.8920

With directors

37

6.9432

6.0811

Without directors

32

6.7469

6.9093

With directors

37

-0.5216

27.1819

Without directors

32

15.2875

73.8969

With directors

37

52.4838

17.3065

Without directors

32

49.8344

15.7334

With directors

37

33.410

50.105

Without directors

32

11.333

18.443

With directors

37

116,453,317

259,771,606

Without directors

32

71,104,756

139,715,211

With directors

37

37.022567

54,428,742

Without directors

32

27,244,124

48,492,215

As seen in Table 5, the indicators of profitability (net profit margin, return on
assets, and return on equity) of the companies with female members of the BofD
are lower compared to companies with no participation of women in the board.
However, the ROIC is greater in companies with women in the BofD, coinciding
with the findings of Martín and Minguez (2014), Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne (2007), who found a positive relationship between the companies’
performance and the percentage of women in their BofD. These results would
indicate that companies with female directors have a better leverage on capital investment (inventory, accounts receivable, and fixed assets minus short-term debts)
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to generate returns. In this sense, it is important to mention that this is one of
the most rigorous tests for determining corporate performance, since it takes into
account the companies’ capital turnover.
On the other hand, this result shows that, in terms of financial leverage, the
companies with female members of the BofD have much lower results than enterprises where women are not part of the board, thus confirming women’s aversion
to risk, which matches the findings of the BIRF (2010), Escandón and Arias (2011),
and Díaz and Jiménez (2010), according to whom women take less financial risk
than men. However, leverage is greater in companies with female directors, which
would be due to the fact that they have a greater operating leverage.
Table 5 shows that there is a large dispersion of data in almost all the variables,
since in most cases the standard deviation is greater than the mean, such that it will
be necessary to use non-parametric testing to contrast the hypothesis of difference
between the groups.
Table 6 shows the verification of the hypotheses with the calculation of the
Mann-Whitney U-test, with a confidence level of 96%; the null hypothesis of the
research is rejected if p (significance level) is less than 0.05.
Table 6. Hypothesis testing (Mann-Whitney Test)
Range
average

Statistical significance /
decision

Ho1: The net margin of companies with women
in the BofD is equal to that of companies with no
women in the BofD.

(1) 32.28

0.227

(2) 38.14

It is not possible to reject Ho1

Ho2: The return on assets of companies with women
in the BofD is equal to that of companies with no
women in the BofD.

(1) 34.14

0.700

(2) 36.00

It is not possible to reject Ho2

Ho3: The return on equity of companies with women
in the BofD is equal to that of companies with no
women in the BofD.

(1) 34.73

0.904

(2) 35.31

It is not possible to reject Ho3

Ho4: The return on investment of companies with
women in the BofD is equal to that of companies
with no women in the BofD.

(1) 35.81

0.718

(2) 34.06

It is not possible to reject Ho4

(1) 34.38

0.782

(2) 35.72

It is not possible to reject Ho5

Hypothesis

Ho5: The financial leverage of companies with
women in the BofD is equal to that of companies
with no women in the BofD.

Equidad Desarro. N.º 32 • julio-diciembre de 2018

The Relationship between Profitability and the Participation of Women in the Board of Directors

Hypothesis
Ho6: The total leverage of companies with women
in the BofD is equal to that of companies with no
women in the BofD.
Ho7: The number of employees in companies with
women in the BofD is equal to that of companies
with no women in the BofD.
Ho8: The value of the assets of companies with
women in the BofD is equal to that of companies
with no women in the BofD.
Ho9: The value of the equity of companies with
women in the BofD is equal to that of companies
with no women in the BofD.

Range
average

Statistical significance /
decision

(1) 35.89

0.691

(2) 33.97

It is not possible to reject Ho6

(1) 40.32

0.018

28.84 (2)

It rejects Ho7

(1) 39.03

0.073

(2) 30.34

It rejects Ho8

(1) 37.68

0.234

(2) 31.91

It is not possible to reject Ho9

(1) Companies with the participation of women in the BofD.
(2) Companies with the participation of women in the BofD.
Source: Own elaboration.

According to the results of the statistical test shown in Table 6, the financial indicators (net profit margin, return on assets, return on equity, ROIC, total leverage,
financial leverage, as well as the number of employees, the value of the assets, and
the value of sales) are different (average range) between companies with women
in the BofD and those without.
The results also show that the financial indicators of performance (net profit
margin, return on assets, and return on equity) are higher in companies without
women in the BofD than those with female members. These findings are consistent with those of Martín and Minguez (2014), who found that there is a negative
relationship between the percentage of women in the BofD and performance in
companies in the primary sector, given the limitations of female participation.
On the other hand, the indicator is higher in the ROIC of companies with female
directors, which is consistent with the findings of Martín and Minguez (2014), who
found a positive relationship between the percentage of women participating in the
board and the performance of businesses in the secondary and tertiary sectors. It
is also consistent with the findings of Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne
(2007), Adler (2001), Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), and the Catalyst (2004),
who found a positive relationship between the percentage of women in the BofD
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and the company’s performance. These last findings are relevant, insofar as it is
a rigorous test for determining a company’s performance, as it takes into account
variables such as rotation of capital investment, tax burden, and operating result.
Financial leverage, for its part, is greater in companies with no women in the
BofD, because women have a higher aversion to risk than men. These findings
are corroborated with the work of BIRF (2010), Escandón and Arias (2011), Diaz
and Jimenez (2010), and Briano and Saavedra (2015).
As far as total leverage is concerned, the average indicator is higher in companies with female directors, since they have a greater operating leverage (fixed
costs), due to being larger companies, as corroborated by the average results in the
number of employees, the value of the assets, and the capital accounting, where
all these values are higher in enterprises with female participation in the BofD.
On the other hand, there were no statistically significant results to reject the
hypothesis of mean differences between the groups, since there was such a high
dispersion of the data; only in the case of two hypotheses it was possible to make
the statistical decision to reject the null hypothesis on the number of employees
(Ho7) and on the value of the assets (Ho8).

Conclusions
Despite the progress made on gender equity in the workplace, women still face
restrictions when trying to ascend to leadership positions. In this work, we sought
to establish the relationship between the participation of women in the BofD and
profitability. We also aimed to determine, for the Mexican case, that it is related
to profitability being measured with the ROIC, which is a relevant finding consistent with previous literature, as it is one the most rigorous tests for determining a
company’s performance, even if, with the indicators (net margin, return on assets,
and return on equity), the profitability of companies without female participation
in the BofD is greater than that of companies with women in the BofD. However,
not only is it worth noting that there are economic benefits to having women in
the BofD, but it should also be considered from the point of view of gender diversity as an indicator of corporate social responsibility that affects, among other
things, the company’s image of the company. It also generates greater creativity in
decision-making and represents reality better by accepting that organizations are
made up of men and women who have the same rights and capabilities.
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On the other hand, a lower financial leverage was found in companies with
participation of women in the BofD, which matches the findings in the literature,
that women have more aversion to risk than men, which is why men have a higher
performance and which would also explain the findings of this study about the
lower profitability in companies with women in the BofD. The opposite happened
with the total leverage, which is greater in the case of companies with female
directors, given that they have a greater operating leverage due to being larger
companies, as corroborated by the results of the operational indicators, such as
number of employees, value of assets, and capital value.
The limitations of this study were that, with such a small sample, it was not
possible to separate the companies by sector; moreover, a longitudinal analysis that
could have yielded more compelling results was not made either.
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